Food and Drug Administration (FDA) advisory committees have a significant influence on patterns of clinical practice worldwide. Recent guidance to the committees by the FDA has focused on attempting to eliminate sources of bias due to committee voting procedures. Nevertheless, major sources of social influence have not been addressed. We analyzed transcripts of Circulatory Systems Devices Panel meetings from 1997 to 2005 in which the panel cast votes on premarket approval and for which a voting minority existed. Committee members who are assigned to speak later are significantly more likely to be in the voting minority (P , 0.001). This effect holds for meetings with sequential voting (P = 0.0058) and for meetings with simultaneous voting (P = 0.045). A weaker effect shows that, for meetings with sequential voting, committee members who vote later are significantly more likely to be in the voting minority (P = 0.018). Speaking order and voting order are both determined by seating location. We therefore conclude that voting behavior on FDA expert advisory committees is strongly associated with seating location. This suggests the presence of a possible social dynamic that is not addressed by existing FDA committee procedures.
INTRODUCTION
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) review committees were chartered with the intention of bringing together experts to generate recommendations for the approval of innovative drugs, devices, and biologics. 1, 2 These committees meet publicly to make recommendations to the FDA on the premarket approval (PMA) process for the most innovative and highest-riskclass devices 3 accounting for 50-80 of the 8000 new medical devices marketed each year. 4 An FDAapproved device will typically be covered quickly by insurance and consequently disseminated throughout medical practice. 5 Furthermore, FDA approval prevents consumers from suing the device sponsor in matters related to the device's safety and effectiveness. 5, 6 If correct, the recommendations of these committees can have a significant positive influence on the public health by enabling the spread of a safe and effective new therapy. On the other hand, an incorrect decision might have a significant negative effect, either through the denial of a potentially lifesaving therapy to millions, or through the widespread adoption of a faulty therapy leading to an equally large number of adverse events.
Recent criticisms argue that a committee's potential for objective, evidence-based recommendations might be compromised by the presence of financial 7 and/or intellectual 7, 8 conflicts of interest among its members, perhaps leading to a biased decision. Because it is rare that a panel member with appropriate expertise will not have been exposed to some form of conflict of interest during his or her career, this creates a tension known as the ''shared-pool dilemma'' 8 wherein the very same people who would review a drug, device, or biologic are the most likely to be conflicted. The FDA is therefore required to balance between relevant expertise and potential bias in selecting committee members. This argument might be taken to suggest that the objective data could somehow be separated from the social element of a committee decision. Nevertheless, committee decisions are inherently social processes. 9 As such, they are likely to be influenced by social factors, for example, committee procedure.
Committee procedures include voting rules and the meeting structure in which information about a given PMA is discussed. For example, panel members can ask questions from the industry sponsor in a preassigned order or they can ask questions as they occur. Voting could follow a consensus rule requiring that all panel members vote the same way or a simple majority rule. Voting may also occur simultaneously or sequentially.
The FDA has recently attempted to address the role of some of these social factors by altering voting procedures; in particular, by endorsing a switch from sequential to simultaneous voting for all of its advisory committees. 10 Nevertheless, the majority of social activity within committee meetings typically occurs before voting, during discussion among panel members, device sponsors, and the FDA representatives. There are therefore opportunities for unintended social influence processes that might impact voting outcome before the actual vote being held. In particular, we examine the role of initial speaking turns and, by extension, seating location of committee members-a variable that is under the control of the committee chair and the FDA executive secretary. 11 We conducted an observational study to determine the impact of procedure on voting behavior. Our data source was the full set of transcripts of Circulatory Systems Devices Panel meetings between 1997 and 2005 in which the committee voted on a PMA. This set of 37 meetings was then narrowed to a subset of 17 meetings in which there was a voting minority of at least one member. Of these, 9 meetings used a sequential voting procedure, and 8 meetings used a simultaneous voting procedure. A pair of half-day meetings was counted as 2 separate transcripts.
Some might argue that procedural factors are only important to the extent that they overlap with expertise or professional status. We therefore also investigated the association between voting behavior and a measure of expertise. We nevertheless acknowledge that expertise is difficult to define a priori due to the highly specialized nature of the skill set required for these committees.
Focus on the Circulatory Systems Devices panel is timely because of the increasing use, complexity, and cost of cardiovascular devices. 5, 12 In addition, the FDA recently published guidelines encouraging the use of simultaneous voting due to concerns that sequential voting might unfairly impact the outcome of approval committee meetings through ''order bias.'' 10 
MATERIALS AND METHODS
We performed an initial examination of the impact of expertise on voting behavior to assess the need to control for this variable. We then examined the roles of assigned speaking order and voting order on voting behavior. In FDA Advisory Committee meetings, committee members are typically seated at a U-shaped or V-shaped table. The committee chair sits at the center, or apex, of this table-a location from which she or he can make visual contact with all voting members. A diagram of a typical FDA Advisory Committee Meeting room layout is shown in Figure 1 .
The seating locations of the other members are jointly determined by the committee chair and the FDA's executive secretary for that committee. 12 Hence, voting order and speaking order are both driven by the seating locations of panel members.
After the industry sponsor and the FDA have given their presentations, as many as 2 panel lead reviewers may give independent reviews. Aside from clarification questions that might be asked during the earlier parts of the meeting, these reviewers are the first to speak formally. After their reviews, the committee chair asks other committee members to comment or ask questions of the FDA or device sponsor. The chair typically follows the lead reviewers by choosing the committee member immediately physically adjacent to the last lead reviewer to speak. Once this member has finished speaking, the next adjacent member follows, proceeding clockwise, or counterclockwise, around the table, at the committee chair's discretion. We therefore define speaking order as the order in which committee members are called upon by the committee chair during the first round of questions. The order as defined here depends directly on the seating locations of the panel members following the lead reviewers. It therefore does not consider potential interruptions by the committee chair or voting members who request clarification out of turn. Later rounds of discussion need not follow this same order.
Data acquisition and coding
For each voting member, we recorded the gender (male or female), medical specialty (surgery, cardiology, radiology, electrophysiology, statistics, other), h-Index 13 (a metric of expertise), years in practice, and race (white, black, Hispanic, other). We also obtained the speaking order and voting order data of the panelists by reading and hand-coding each transcript. Coding proceeded by assigning the first speaker (eg, the first lead reviewer) the number 1, the second 2, etc. To allow for comparisons across meetings, each number was then divided by the total number of voting members such that the first speaker was always in position 1/(# members) and the last speaker was always in position ''1.'' The same procedure was used to code voting order. Abstaining voters were not included.
Data analysis
We first used an analysis of variance with a dichotomous dependent variable 14 to examine the effect of hIndex on voting outcome, while controlling for gender, medical specialty, years in practice, and race.
We note that the coding mechanism for speaking order defines 2 data distributions for each independent variable. For each distribution, we compared the location in the speaking order for committee members in the voting majority with those in the voting minority across a set of the 37 Circulatory Systems Devices panel meeting transcripts from meetings held from 1997 to 2005, in which the panel voted on recommendations for device Premarket Approval. Meetings in which every panel member voted the same way were excluded, leaving 17 meetings in the analysis. We used a nonparametric Mann-Whitney U test to test for a difference in the median of the distributions. The same analysis was performed on the subset of 9 meetings in which voting was sequential and on the subset of 8 meetings in which voting was simultaneous. In addition, we tested the impact of voting order on voting behavior for the 9 meetings with sequential voting.
Role of the funding source
The funding source had no involvement in the study design.
RESULTS
We found that the h-Index had no observable effect on voting outcome (f = 0.21; P = 0.65). Figure 2 shows boxplots of the speaking order distributions for committee members in the voting minority and the voting majority. A Mann-Whitney U test shows that committee members in the voting minority are significantly more likely (P , 0.001) to be assigned a later position in the speaker order than are committee members in the voting majority. The same results hold when lead reviewers are excluded from the analysis (P , 0.001). For the subset of 9 meetings in which voting occurred sequentially (eg, according to seating order), a Mann-Whitney U test shows that speaking order is associated with voting behavior (P = 0.0058). Within this same subset of meetings, a Mann-Whitney U test shows that voting order is also significantly associated with voting behavior (P = 0.018). In particular, members of the voting majority were more likely to vote earlier. The effect of voting order (x 2 = 5.64) is not as strong as the effect of speaking order (x 2 = 7.61). For the subset of 8 meetings in which voting occurred simultaneously (eg, all voting members raised their hands if they were in favor of a particular proposal), a Mann-Whitney U test shows that speaking order is significantly associated with voting behavior (P = 0.048).
DISCUSSION
Our findings suggest that assigned speaking order on the Circulatory Systems Devices Panel influences voting outcome. In particular, those panel members who are formally designated to speak first may be more likely to influence other panel members. This finding stands in contrast to the FDA approach of attempting to mitigate bias through the use of simultaneous voting. Although voting order is also positively associated with voting behavior in sequential meetings, we find that the effect of speaking order is stronger; indicating that the voting order effect might be caused by the speaking order effect. This is a particularly compelling explanation because discussion always occurs before voting. Furthermore, the fact that an association between speaking order and voting outcome exists even in the presence of simultaneous voting suggests that recent changes to FDA voting procedures may not have eliminated the social dynamic responsible for this finding.
The FDA Policy and Guidance Handbook emphasizes the role of the FDA Executive Secretary and the committee chair in choosing the seating order for different panel members. 11 Both speaking order and voting order are associated with assigned seating location, suggesting that their assignment by the committee chair and panel executive secretary might create a predisposition toward a particular panelist's preferred voting outcome before discussion commences. One may read these results to suggest that choice of seating location is one possible lever by which control over the decision-making process might be exercised. If this were the case, one might expect the preferences of key FDA personnel to be even more strongly correlated with voting outcome than is speaking order. Nevertheless, data on FDA representatives' private preferences are not available.
A different interpretation would suggest that one might choose seating order to reflect relevant expertise, rather than a particular desired outcome. Although we found no association between h-Index, a measure of academic expertise, and voting outcome, we note that it may not be clear a priori, whose expertise is most relevant. This is often the case on interdisciplinary advisory panels where different standards of expertise (eg, academic vs. clinical) are present or might change depending upon the relationship between the medical specialties represented and the device being reviewed. 8 In any case, it is important to be aware of the potential procedural consequences of seating order on FDA advisory panels.
Earlier speakers have more control over the definition of the problems that later speakers might ultimately use. This effect, known as framing, 15 suggests a mechanism by which earlier speakers could impact the voting outcome; they are more likely to be able to define the issues discussed in the panel meeting. Even though later speakers might make very cogent comments, they may be more likely to do so in response to a topic of conversation that has already been introduced, rather than abruptly changing the subject to a topic of their own interest. This could lead to a situation wherein later speakers' opinions are less likely to be discussed, and hence, are more likely to be in the minority. Alternatively, later speakers might feel less ownership of the majority position and might be less willing to endorse it. These results point to the role of speaking order as an important procedural variable.
The implication of this finding is that there is a social effect on FDA Advisory Committees that cannot be FIGURE 2. Mann-Whitney U test finds a significant difference between the median speaking order rank of voting majority and voting minority voting members in the 17 meetings in which there was a voting minority (abstentions were not included); P , 0.001. Voting minority members speak later than voting majority members do. The same results hold when lead reviewers are excluded from the analysis (P , 0.001).
American Journal of Therapeutics (2011) 0(0) www.americantherapeutics.com eliminated using a change in the voting procedure. If the FDA is willing to explicitly recognize differing levels of expertise among panel members in advance, speaking order could be chosen such that the most expert panelists speak first (as is the case with the lead reviewers). This would give a strong advantage to their opinions. Alternatively, the least expert could speak first, enabling these panelists to air their views in a manner that has not yet been influenced by more expert panelists. Given that committee members must speak in some order, the only possible way to mitigate this effect would be to have panel members prepare statements in advance after having heard presentations of all of the available data. The costs of such a procedure to the FDA might be prohibitive, due to the time required for each panel member to generate such a statement.
CONCLUSIONS
The decisions of FDA advisory committees determine patterns of medical practice in the United States and worldwide. Current debates about the efficacy of these committees are framed in the context of the intrusion of social factors, such as financial conflicts of interest, into a process that is otherwise nominally objective. Our findings suggest that this could be a false dichotomy, because committee decisions are inherently social processes. Our results show social effects clearly impacting on the voting outcome. Attempts to eliminate these social effects, such as by changing the voting procedures, may not prove sufficient because they do not address the underlying social dynamics. Implementing procedural change that might address these dynamics may be too costly or disruptive to current FDA panel practices. We therefore suggest that a productive debate should move in the direction of understanding how best to integrate social and scientific elements of decision making so as to allow decisions that lead to the desired outcomes, namely, the timely release of innovative products on the market in a manner that is consistent with our best standards of safety and efficacy.
